fighting. In 1915 they still believed that a rapid decision was likely—the Germans on the Eastern Front, the French and British on the Western. Why therefore waste energy and man-power on the harvests of 1916, 1917 and 1918? It was a great piece of luck for us that we were not alone in cherishing this dangerous obsession. Neither intelligence nor stupidity are the monopoly of any single nation. Victory is a question of the balance at the critical moment. This fortuitous circumstance constituted an important *fatal oversight* and ruining Germany. Had she devoted a reasonable share of forethought to her precarious food position, and started in 1915 to concentrate her scientific resources and great organising gifts on food production, she might have averted the disasters of 1918 and achieved a less humiliating peace.

The conflict of foresight and obtuseness is clearly shown in the record of our own dealings with this *Recommen- issue- As* early as the summer of 1915 *dation of* a Committee was set up under the *Lord Miner's* presidency of Lord Milner to consider *Committee* measures for increasing the output of food. It reported that the country must go back to the agricultural system of the 'seventies ; it must recover the old arable area by ploughing up the land which in the intervening decades had been laid down

to permanent grass. A million more acres should be put under wheat. Guaranteed prices should be accorded for a four-year period to give farmers an inducement to break up their pasture, and better wages should be secured to agricultural workers.

This intelligent and constructive proposal had to wait nearly two years before it was carried into effect.